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CLAYTON ACT SCRUTINY OF NONPROFIT
HOSPITAL MERGERS: THE WRONG Rx FOR
AILING INSTITUTIONS
Abstract The Sherman and Clayton antitrust laws have long been used to challenge
anticompetitive mergers between for-profit entities. Recently, the federal government
began challenging mergers between nonprofit hospitals under the Clayton Act. Two fed-
eral circuit courts are divided on whether nonprofit mergers are subject to Clayton Act
scrutiny. This Comment examines the statutory interpretations and the policy arguments
suggested by the two cases, and concludes that the Clayton Act does not, and should not,
apply to nonprofit hospital mergers.
Memorial Hospital' was founded in the 1950s, during the heyday of
hospital construction. It was one of two nonprofit hospitals serving
Littleton, a town of 65,000 inhabitants situated three hours north of
Metropolis. For over thirty years, Memorial was a fixture in the com-
munity. A generation of Littleton residents were born there, or at St.
Luke's, its cross-town rival. Although Memorial's facilities had
decayed over the years, the hospital seemed healthy, so townspeople
were surprised when the hospital board announced that Memorial
would soon close.
Nonprofit hospitals2 throughout the country face daunting chal-
lenges caused by escalating costs, reduced revenues, and fundamental
changes in the delivery of health care These challenges have led to
unprecedented numbers of hospital closures during the past five
years.4 Before hospital boards5 consider closure, they consider less
drastic alternatives, including merging their hospitals with those of
competitors.6 Mergers7 between nonprofit hospitals can maintain the
viability of marginal institutions, reduce excess hospital capacity,' and
1. Memorial Hospital is fictional, but represents a real facility in New England that closed in
1987.
2. The terms "nonprofit hospital" and "hospital" used throughout this Comment refer to
nonprofit, non-governmental, acute-care facilities. Although for-profit hospitals exist in large
numbers, nonprofit hospitals predominate, and are the subject here.
3. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 27.
5. See infra note 30 for a discussion of the role of nonprofit hospital boards.
6. See infra note 30.
7. The term "merger" as used here refers generically to the various methods of consolidating
former competitors (often called "horizontal" mergers). It does not include mergers between
non-competitors.
Mergers are categorized as one of three types: horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate. See IV E.
KniTNER, FEDERAL ATrraRusr LAW §§ 33.6-33.9 (1984).
8. Reduction can occur through the conversion of underused acute-care facilities to other
purposes, including the provision of outpatient, long-term, psychiatric, substance-abuse
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enhance the quality and accessibility of health care provided in a com-
munity.9 Such mergers, however, pose serious risks of violating fed-
eral and state antitrust laws."'
Nonprofit hospital mergers may violate either of two antitrust
laws:" section 1 of the Sherman Act, 2 or section 7 of the Clayton
Act.13 These acts apparently differ significantly in their scrutiny of
mergers.1 4 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits mergers where the
purpose or actual effect is to restrain trade.1" Section 7 of the Clayton
Act proscribes mergers that may have future anticompetitive effects,
without a showing of actual effects.1 6
The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether section
7 of the Clayton Act applies to nonprofit entities, such as nonprofit
hospitals.' 7 The federal government,'" however, has for the first time
in history begun challenging these mergers under the Clayton Act. 9
Although Clayton Act section 7 expressly applies only to stock acqui-
treatment, or other specialized health care services. See, ag., Greene, Do Mergers Work?
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Mar. 19, 1990, at 28.
9. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
10. Most states have antitrust laws that parallel federal law. See Wood et al., Acquisitions and
Mergers, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES Appendix A, 644 PLY
Corp 225, June 1, 1989 (PLI Order No. B4-6880) (text on WESTLAW). State antitrust law is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
11. Note that this Comment does not discuss all provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts
under which mergers may be challenged. For example, some mergers may violate the
prohibitions of section 2 of the Sherman Act ("attempts to monopolize"), or section 5 of the
Clayton Act ("unfair competition").
12. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1973 & Supp. 1991).
13. Id. § 18.
14. Commentators disagree whether, in practice, the Sherman and Clayton Acts impose
different standards. See American Bar Ass'n, Seventh Circuit Says No to Rockford Merger, 4
HEALTH LAWYER, Spring-Summer 1990, at 1 (suggesting the standards are different). But see II
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 304 (1978) (arguing that there is no difference).
See also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355 (1963), where the Court
said: "To be sure, not every violation of § 7, as amended, would necessarily be a violation of the
Sherman Act...."; United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1964); Brown
Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 n.30 (1962).
15. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (on the
"purpose or effect" standard).
16. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 317-18 & n.32; United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957) (discussing "incipiency" standard under Clayton Act section 7).
17. The author can find no Supreme Court cases involving mergers between nonprofit entities
under section 7 of the Clayton Act.
18. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have concurrent
authority to enforce most antitrust laws. See Wood, supra note 10, at 15. Despite overlapping
authority, the practical effects of DOJ or FTC enforcement are very different. See Burda, A
Legal Drama in Two Acts: Why Hospital Execs Should Know the Law in Antitrust Defense,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 5, 1990, at 40.
19. Kopit & McCann, Toward a Definitive Antitrust Standard for Nonprofit Hospital Mergers,
13 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 635, 647-48 (1988).
1042
Clayton Act and Nonprofit Hospital Mergers
sitions, or to asset acquisitions by entities subject to Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) jurisdiction,2" two circuit courts recently split on
the proper interpretation of section 7. In United States v. Rockford
Memorial Corp.,2 the Seventh Circuit said in dicta that Clayton Act
section 7 does apply to nonprofit hospitals.22 In United States v. Cari-
lion Health System,23 by contrast, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dis-
missal of a section 7 claim for lack of FTC jurisdiction over the
nonprofit hospitals.24
This Comment examines the statutory interpretations used in
Rockford and Carilion, and concludes that neither the language of
Clayton Act section 7, nor the legislative history behind it, supports its
application to nonprofit hospital mergers. Furthermore, exempting
nonprofit hospitals from section 7 of the Clayton Act is consistent
with public policy initiatives aimed at systematically reducing hospital
capacity, maintaining access to health care, and improving the quality
of care provided. Finally, the Sherman Act offers sufficient protection
against any harmful effects of nonprofit hospital mergers.
I. BACKGROUND: HOSPITAL MERGERS AND
ANTITRUST LAW
A. The Current Status of Hospitals
The hospital industry underwent a dramatic transformation during
the 1980s, fundamentally changing the way hospital services are deliv-
ered and paid for.25 These changes reduced the demand for inpatient
20. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 1973 & Supp. 1991). The scope of FTC jurisdiction is contained
in sections 4 and 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 44, 45 (West 1973 & Supp. 1991).
21. 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990).
22. Id. at 1281.
23. 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989) (unpublished opinion) (text in WESTLAW, Federal
directory, CTA4 file), aff'g 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989).
24. Id. In a case decided as this Comment goes to press, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed a district court and enjoined a merger between two nonprofit hospitals in
Augusta, Georgia. FTC v. University Health, Inc., No. 91-8308, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 16503,
1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,508 (11th Cir. July 26, 1991). The court relied heavily on Judge
Posner's dictum in Rockford and held that section 7 of the Clayton Act was applicable to
nonprofit hospital mergers. 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 16503 at *14-20.
25. This transformation involved two broad, and related, areas of change: (1) a fundamental
shift away from cost-based reimbursement for hospital services under federal, state, and private
insurance plans; and (2) changes in the way health care services are delivered, through the rapid
growth of competitive alternatives to inpatient hospital services. These broad categories are
discussed briefly below; for more thorough treatment of these issues, see Baker, The Antitrust
Analysis of Hospital Mergers and the Transformation of the Hospital Industry, 51 LAw &
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hospital services,2 6 and contributed to unprecedented numbers of hos-
pital closures27 and mergers.2" The majority of closures and mergers
involved nonprofit hospitals.2 9
Mergers are an important option for nonprofit hospitals struggling
to survive.30  Recently, however, the federal government has chal-
CONTEMP. PROBS. 93 (1988); Comment, The Role of Medicare Reimbursement in Contemporary
Hospital Finance, I1 AM. J. L. & MED. 501 (1986).
In 1983, the federal government stopped reimbursing hospitals based on the actual costs of
treating Medicare patients (called "cost-based" reimbursement), and instituted the Prospective
Payment System (PPS), which reimburses hospitals a fixed rate based on the average cost of
treating a patient diagnosed with a particular condition. Id. at 508-09. This change put
hospitals at risk for any costs incurred that exceeded the fixed reimbursement amount. Id
During the 1980s, increases in Medicare reimbursement failed to keep pace with increases in
hospital costs. Id. Moreover, states and private insurers instituted a variety of similar means of
constraining reimbursement. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS'N (AHA), HOSPITAL STATISTICS:
A COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. HOSPITALS xxxi (1990) [hereinafter AHA HOSPITAL
STATISTICS]; BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD, ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS 1990, at 16-18.
During the 1980s, technological breakthroughs and new payment incentives caused dramatic
changes in the delivery of hospital services. Many treatments previously performed only in
hospitals are now performed on an outpatient basis at freestanding medical, surgical, and
diagnostic centers. AHA HOSPITAL STATISTICS at xxxi, xli. Hospitals thus compete with one
another, and with numerous other institutions, to provide health services. Id Statistics
demonstrate this trend: in 1979, 86 percent of surgeries were performed on an inpatient basis; by
1989, this figure was about 50 percent. Id. at xxxviii. Between 1979 and 1989, the number of
outpatient surgeries increased by 300 percent, while the number of inpatient surgeries declined
by 30 percent. Id.
26. Demand for inpatient hospital services declined throughout most of the 1980s, resulting
in poor financial performance by many hospitals. AHA HOSPITAL STATISTICS, supra note 25, at
xxxv-xxxix. Total hospital admissions fell 11 percent between 1979 and 1989. Id. at xxxvi.
Average hospital occupancy rates fell from 74 percent in 1979 to 66 percent in 1989. Id. at xxxii.
According to AHA estimates, 20 percent of existing inpatient hospital capacity is expected to
close by the year 2000. AHA News, June 20, 1988, p. 3.
27. Since 1980, 508 community hospitals have closed in the U.S. AHA HOSPITAL
STATISTICS, supra note 25, at xxxiii. Still more hospitals are "ailing"--unable to meet operating
expenses or to accumulate capital reserves to replace buildings and equipment. In 1989, the
average hospital generated less than one-half of one percent margin from patient care revenues.
BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD, supra note 25, at 17. See also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., HOSPITAL CLOSURE: 1987, PUB. No. OAI-04-89-00740
(May 1989), reprinted in [New Developments] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 1 37,864
(1989).
28. Between 1980 and 1987, 167 nonprofit hospitals were involved in mergers. Burke, Mixed
Signals From Government Have Chilling Effect On Mergers, HOSPITALS, June 5, 1990, at 36.
29. Between 1980 and 1987, 87 percent of hospital mergers involved nonprofit hospitals. Id.
Further, 83 percent of community hospital closures in 1986 were nonprofit facilities. Muller,
45% More Community Hospitals Closed In '86, HOSPITALS, May 5, 1987, at 32.
30. Nonprofit hospitals are usually directed by volunteer boards with close ties to the
community. For background on the role of such boards, see A. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF
HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 114-19 (2d ed. 1988); Gray & McNerney,
For-Profit Enterprise in Health Care: The Institute of Medicine Study, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1523, 1524 (1985); Horwitz, Corporate Reorganization: The Last Gasp or Last Clear Chance for
the Tax-Exempt, Nonprofit Hospital?, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 527, 529-31 (1988); Oleck, Nature of
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lenged such mergers as violations of the antitrust laws.31 The proper
application of these laws thus will determine whether such mergers are
legal.32
B. Federal Antitrust Merger Law
Federal antitrust merger law seeks to maintain the competitiveness
of the marketplace, and thus protect consumers, by preventing sellers
from achieving sufficient market power33 to significantly affect market
prices 4.3  The underlying concern with mergers is the elimination of
competition, resulting in either collusion among competitors, or pure
monopoly. 35 Two statutes form the basis for merger law: section 1 of
the Sherman Act,36 and section 7 of the Clayton Act.37 Cases inter-
preting these laws define the bounds of merger doctrine.3
1. The Sherman Act
The Sherman Act, passed in 1890, broadly proscribes anticompeti-
tive practices. Section 1 of the Act states, "[e]very contract, combina-
tion..., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade..., is declared to be
illegal."'39 Because section 1 of the Sherman Act is both broad and
vague, courts have sought to define its limits.' Importantly, courts
have interpreted section 1 to mean that only unreasonable restraints of
trade are illegal.4
To determine whether a restraint is unreasonable, courts categorize
activities as either: (1) "per se" illegal; or (2) subject to "rule of rea-
Nonprofit Organizations in 1979, 10 U. TOt. L. REv. 962, 965-68, 980-84 (1979) (on the number
and strength of nonprofits).
31. This appears to be part of a trend of stepped-up antitrust enforcement against all
hospitals--for-profit and nonprofit. Holthaus, FTC Joins Examiners of Not-For-Profit Mergers
HosPrrALs, Dec. 5, 1988, at 52. See generally, Campbell & Teevans, Mixed Signal" Recent
Cases Make the Legality of Future Hospital Mergers Less Predictable, 59 ANTRrusr L. 1005,
1007-09 (1991) (discussing the history of hospital merger prosecutions).
32. See supra note 14; infra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
33. "Market power is the ability to raise prices by restricting output." P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 14, at 501.
34. For a thorough discussion of the economic basis for antitrust policy, see id. at 401.
35. IV P. AREEDA & D. TURN, ANTrrUsT LAW 901 (1980). The fewer the number of
competitors, the easier they can collude-explicitly or implicitly-to restrict output and raise
prices. Id.
36. 15 U.S.C.A. § I (West 1973 & Supp. 1991).
37. Id. at § 18.
38. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 35, at 909.
39. 15 U.S.C.A. § I (West 1973 & Supp. 1991).
40. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
41. Id.; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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son" analysis.42 Certain activities, such as price-fixing by competitors,
are considered inherently unreasonable, and are categorized as per se
illegal.43 Other activities, including mergers, may or may not be rea-
sonable, depending upon their particular facts. These activities are
examined on a case-by-case basis under the rule of reason standard.'
The goal of Sherman Act section 1 regarding mergers is to prohibit
combinations where the purpose or effect is to limit competition.45
Under this standard, a defendant must have anticompetitive intent, or
the actual effect of a merger must be anticompetitive, to violate the
statute.46
2. The Clayton Act
The Clayton Act was passed in 1914, in response to a widespread
belief that the Sherman Act was ineffective in forestalling many
anticompetitive practices.47 The Clayton Act specifically defined pro-
scribed activities, 48 including certain mergers, and permitted the gov-
ernment to enjoin potentially harmful mergers without showing actual
anticompetitive effects.49
Originally, section 7 prohibited only mergers accomplished through
the acquisition of stock or capital shares.50 Thus, as enacted, section 7
contained a loophole through which businesses consolidated by
42. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63-65 (1911) (explaining per se and rule of reason
standards). Courts do not hear justifications for per se illegal activities. Id.
43. Id.
44. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979)
("Mergers ... are not per se illegal, and many of them withstand attack under any existing
antitrust standard."); see also Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768
(1984).
45. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953).
46. Id.; see also Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768; Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 59-60.
47. See E. KINTNER, supra note 7, at § 33.1.
48. The specific proscriptions of the Clayton Act contrast with the broad scope of the
Sherman Act. See A. SOUTHWICK, supra note 30, at 187-90.
49. Section 7 of the Clayton Act says: "No person ... shall acquire... the stock or other
share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the [FTC] shall acquire ... the assets of
one or more persons.., where ... the effect... may be substantially to lessen competition ...."
15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 1973 & Supp. 1991). Courts have interpreted this language to permit
challenges of mergers where there is a probable anticompetitive effect, but no actual effect.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 323 (1965);
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1964).
50. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 1973 &
Supp. 1991)).
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purchasing the assets of other entities."1 In 1950, Congress amended
the Act to close this loophole.5 2
The Celler-Kefauver amendments extended section 7 coverage to
asset acquisitions that were, in substance, mergers.53 However, the
amendments did not proscribe all mergers accomplished by asset
acquisition. The amendments expressly limited section 7 coverage to
mergers by entities subject to FTC jurisdiction.54
The scope of FTC jurisdiction is contained in sections 4 and 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"), 5 passed the same year
as the Clayton Act. Sections 4 and 5 of the FTC Act, taken together,
limit FTC jurisdiction over corporations to those operating for
profit.5 6 Thus, the assets acquisition clause of Clayton Act section 7
apparently applied only to for-profit entities.57
Courts have occasionally extended section 7 of the Clayton Act to
cover commercial entities not expressly within the amended statute.5
51. Businesses simply acquired the assets of a target company without changing the
ownership of the target company's stock. Several early Supreme Court decisions upheld the
legality of asset acquisitions in challenges under the original section 7. See, eg., Arrow-Hart &
Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934) (strictly construing Clayton Act section 7); FTC
v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554, 561 (1926) (rejecting the application of section 7 to non-stock
acquisitions).
52. Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 18, 21);
see P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 35, at 902.
53. For a thorough legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Amendments to the Clayton
Act, see 4 E: KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND
RELATED STATUTES 3385-644 (1980).
54. See supra note 49.
55. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, §§ 4, 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (codified at 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 44, 45 (West 1973). The FTC Act created and defined the scope of FTC activity.
56. Section 4 of the FTC Act defines "corporations" as, "any company... or association,
incorporated or unincorporated, which is organized to carry on business for its own profit or that
of its members .... " Id. at § 44.
57. Almost all states prohibit nonprofit corporations from issuing stock or share capital, and
from distributing any net revenues to their directors, officers, or members. See T. BAROCcI,
NoN-PROFIT HosprrALS: THEIR STRUCTURE, HUMAN RESOURCES, AND ECONOMIC
IMPORTANCE 77 (1981); A. SoUTHWICK, supra note 30, at 118-20.
58. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v. Chelsea
Say. Bank, 300 F. Supp. 721 (D. Conn. 1969).
Courts have split over whether the FTC has jurisdiction to challenge nonprofit entities in
antitrust cases not brought under Clayton Act section 7. See, e.g., Community Blood Bank v.
FTC, 405 F.2d 1011, 1022 (8th Cir. 1969) (holding that nonprofit organizations that did not
operate in the pecuniary interests of their members were not within FTC jurisdiction); see also
Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1390 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038
(1987), in which Judge Posner said: "[t]here is a possible gap in the FTC's jurisdiction over
acquisitions involving nonprofit corporations .... "; Baker, supra note 25, at 113 n.104. But cf
American Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2nd Cir. 1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 676 (1982)
(holding that FTC could assert jurisdiction over nonprofit entity acting in the pecuniary interests
1047
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In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank59 the Supreme Court
said it was proper to extend coverage of section 7 to for-profit banks if
consistent with congressional purpose.' The Court examined several
factors to determine congressional purpose: (1) the meaning of key
provisions when read together;6' (2) congressional debates and other
legislative history surrounding the Clayton amendments; 62 and (3) the
rule that "immunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly implied. '63
The Court concluded that Congress did not intend to exempt banks
from section 7 simply because banks were not subject to FTC
jurisdiction."
C. The Circuits Split in Rockford and Carilion
Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether section 7 of
the Clayton Act applies to mergers between nonprofit entities, two fed-
eral circuit courts recently split on this issue. The cases, United States
v. Rockford Memorial Corp.65 and United States v. Carilion Health
System,6 6 involved nonprofit hospital mergers in Rockford, Illinois,
and Roanoke, Virginia. Although similar in their facts, the cases were
decided under very different interpretations of the Clayton Act. The
Rockford court concluded that section 7 is applicable to nonprofit hos-
pitals, while the Carilion court held that section 7 does not so apply.67
of its members); FTC v. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975) (same
holding), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976).
59. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
60. The Philadelphia Court held that a type of bank merger not expressly within the
jurisdiction of the FTC was nevertheless proscribed by section 7 of the Clayton Act, because
Congress intended to close a "loophole" permitting such mergers. Id. at 342-43. See infra notes
61-64 and accompanying text.
61. Philadelphia, 374 U.S. at 342-43. The Court concluded that Congress intended the stock
and assets clauses of section 7, when read together, to cover mergers that were neither purely one
nor the other.
62. Id. at 337-42. The Court cited legislative history to the effect that the Celler-Kefauver
amendments to section 7 were intended to "plug a loophole" in the original Act. Id. at 341 n.19.
63. Id. at 348 (citations omitted). Courts have held, for example, that public policy
considerations are not a defense to, or justification for, anticompetitive practices. See, eg.,
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). In Engineers, the Court condemned under the per
se rule an attempt to enhance public safety by limiting competitive bidding. Id. at 693-95.
64. Philadelphia, 374 U.S. at 343-44. The Court noted that Congress did not exempt banks
from the stock-acquisition provisions of section 7. Id. at 348. Rather, the Court said, Congress
intended to put asset acquisitions on a par with stock acquisitions. Id. at 347 n.23.
65. 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'g 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Inl. 1989).
66. 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989), aff'g in unpublished opinion 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va.).
67. See infra notes 70, 82 and accompanying text.
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L The Rockford Approach
Rockford stands for the principle that section 7 of the Clayton Act
applies to nonprofit hospitals because they are part of an industry sub-
ject to FTC jurisdiction.68 In Rockford, the Seventh Circuit upheld a
district court injunction preventing the merger of two nonprofit hospi-
tals, because the merger violated the Sherman Act.69 In dicta, how-
ever, the Rockford court said that section 7 was applicable to nonprofit
hospital mergers.70
The court reasoned that the section 7 requirement of FTC jurisdic-
tion over entities engaging in asset acquisitions might refer to the juris-
dictional limitations in section 11 of the Clayton Act,7 1 and not to
those imposed by the FTC Act.72 The court said that Clayton Act
section 11 gave five different agencies-including the FTC-authority
to enforce portions of the Clayton Act.7" Four of those agencies had
enforcement authority directed toward specific industries.74 The FTC,
however, was given residual authority to enforce section 7 against "all
other character of commerce."75
The court determined that although section 11 of the Clayton Act
limits FTC jurisdiction over industries that are within the scope of the
other four agencies, it permits unlimited FTC jurisdiction over "all
other character of commerce."'76 Consequently, the court said, only
"mergers in the regulated industries enumerated iii section 11" are
68. The court did not apply section 7 of the Clayton Act in this case for technical reasons.
Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1281.
69. Id at 1286. The court said that section 7 applied to the merger, but that the government
had waived the claim by improper argument. Id at 1280-81.
70. Judge Posner, writing for the court, said, "we believe... that the merger is subject to
section 7" Id at 1281 (emphasis in original).
71. The relevant portion of section 11 says that "[a]uthority to enforce compliance with
sections [2, 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act] by the persons respectively subject thereto is vested in
... the Federal Trade Commission where applicable to all other character of commerce." 15
U.S.C.A. § 21(a) (West 1973 & Supp. 1991).
72. Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1280.
73. Id These agencies include the Ihterstate Commerce Commission, Federal
Communications Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board (now defunct), and Federal Reserve
Board. Id
74. Id.
75. Id Note, however, that the Supreme Court considered and rejected a similar argument.
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 336 n.11 (1963). See infra text
accompanying note Il1.
76. Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1280.
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exempt from section 7.77 The hospital industry was not such an
exempted industry. 8
2. The Carilion Approach
The principle behind Carilion is that section 7 of the Clayton Act
only applies to asset acquisition mergers between entities subject to
FTC jurisdiction.79 Carilion involved the proposed merger of two
large, nonprofit hospitals by means of asset acquisition."0 The Fourth
Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling permitting the hospitals to
merge."1
The Carilion district court dismissed the government's section 7
claim saying that the statute did not apply to non-stock, nonprofit
mergers.82 The court relied upon the legislative history of the 1950
amendments to the Clayton Act.8 3 The court reasoned that the pro-
posed merger of non-stock, nonprofit hospitals did not fall within the
scope of section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended." The Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion."
II. ANALYSIS: GLEANING CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE
Section 7 of the Clayton Act does not, and should not, apply to
nonprofit hospital mergers. Supreme Court opinions are non-disposi-
tive on whether section 7 applies to nonprofit entities.8 6 Statutory con-
struction, however, reveals that section 7 does not apply to nonprofit
77. Id.
78. Id. But see, Adventist Health System/West, No. 9234 (FTC, Aug. 2, 1990) (initial
decision) (WESTLAW, Antitrust directory, FABR-FTC file) (assets acquisition by nonprofit
hospital is not subject to FTC jurisdiction under Clayton Act section 11).
79. United States v. Carilion Health System, 707 F. Supp. 840, 841 n.1 (W.D. Va.), aff'd in
unpublished opinion, 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989) (text in WESTLAW, Federal directory,
CTA4 file).
80. Carilion, 707 F. Supp. at 842.
81. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision without reconsidering the applicability of
Clayton Act section 7 to nonprofit hospitals. Carilion, 892 F.2d at 1042.
82. Carilion, 707 F. Supp. at 841 n.1.
83. Note, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and Federal Antitrust Law: The Quest for Compatibility,
15 DEL. J. CoaP. L. 539, 560 n.130 (1990). See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text for a
description of the legislative history of the Clayton Act amendments.
84. Carilion, 707 F. Supp. at 840.
85. Carilion, 892 F.2d at 1042.
86. Note that in Rockford, the government argued that Philadelphia was dispositive, and
attempted to analogize acquisition of a nonprofit hospital with a stock purchase. United States v.
Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1281 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990).
The court rejected the analogy between banks and nonprofit hospitals as "unnecessarily
venturesome," adding that the view was not "in vogue in the Supreme Court . I..." Id.
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hospitals. In addition, public policy favors exempting nonprofit hospi-
tals from section 7.
A. Statutory Construction of Clayton Act Section 7
L Supreme Court Opinions Are Non-dispositive
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the applicability
of Clayton Act section 7 to nonprofit entities, it has demonstrated the
proper method of construing section 7 de novo.87 The Court deter-
mined in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank that section 7
applies to entities not subject to FTC jurisdiction only if such applica-
tion is consistent with congressional purpose.88 Congress' purpose in
enacting section 7 was to halt consolidations by national, for-profit
conglomerates, 9 not to forestall nonprofit hospital mergers. 90 So con-
strued, section 7 of the Clayton Act does not apply to nonprofit hospi-
tals because non-application is consistent with congressional purpose.
2. The Plain Language and Legislative History of Clayton Act
Section 7 is Consistent With Exemption of Nonprofit
Hospitals
Both the plain language and legislative history of Clayton Act sec-
tion 7 suggest that exemption of nonprofit hospitals is proper. The
Philadelphia Court outlined the proper method of determining the
applicability of section 7 to entities not expressly within FTC jurisdic-
tion.9 1 There, the Court ascertained congressional intent chiefly by
looking at three factors: (1) the meaning of key provisions when read
together;92 (2) congressional debates and other legislative history;93
and (3) the rule that "immunity from antitrust law is not lightly.implied."' 94
(a) The Meaning of Key Provisions Read Together
Key provisions of the Clayton and FTC Acts, when read together,
suggest that Clayton Act section 7 does not apply to mergers between
nonprofit hospitals. As first enacted, section 7 of the Clayton Act cov-
87. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
88. 374 U.S. 321, 337 (1963). ,
89. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 and n.27 (1962); see also infra
notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
90. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
92. See Philadelphia, 374 U.S. at 342.
93. Id. at 337-42.
94. Id at 348.
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ered only stock acquisitions. 95 The 1950 amendments added coverage
of asset acquisitions where the acquiring entity was subject to FTC
jurisdiction.96 The scope of FTC jurisdiction is contained in sections 4
and 5 of the FTC Act, and includes only organizations that operate for
profit.97 Consequently, section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, can-
not apply to non-stock, nonprofit mergers. Mergers between nonprofit
hospitals necessarily fit this category of excluded mergers, because
such entities, by law, may not issue stock or operate for profit.98
Although the Rockford court said that section 11 of the Clayton Act
gave the FTC authority to enforce section 7 against nonprofit hospi-
tals,99 the court reached this conclusion by ignoring principles out-
lined by the Supreme Court in Philadelphia. The Rockford court
reasoned that section 11 was "self-contained ' I and not dependent on
provisions of the FTC Act for definition or limitation. Thus, the court
said, section 11 of the Clayton Act, when read in isolation, did not
exempt the hospital industry. 101
There are three problems with the Rockford court's suggested inter-
pretation. First, accepting the court's interpretation requires the court
to read sections 4 and 5 of the FTC Act completely out of existence.102
Sections 4 and 5 expressly limit the scope of FTC jurisdiction to enti-
ties organized for profit.103 The Rockford court's interpretation, there-
fore, controverts the Philadelphia Court's mandate to read key
provisions together."°
Second, the Rockford court's interpretation of section 11 of the
Clayton Act to create independent FTC jurisdiction requires the court
to take the phrase, "all other character of commerce," out of the con-
text of the statute. Section 11 says, in relevant part: "Authority to
enforce compliance with sections [2, 3, 7, and 8] of [the Clayton Act]
by the persons respectively subject thereto is vested in . .. the [FTC]
where applicable to all other character of commerce .... 5
95. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
98. See A. SoUTHWICK, supra note 30, at 110-13.
99. United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1280 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 295 (1990).
100. Id.
101. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
102. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
103. 15 U.S.C.A. § 44, 45 (West 1973 & Supp. 1991).
104. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 342 (1963).
105. 15 U.S.C.A § 21 (West 1973 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
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The phrases "by the persons... subject thereto" and "where applica-
ble," indicate that section 11 is not independent and self-contained,
but instead refers to other statutory language to define the persons
"subject thereto." Consequently, section 11 provides no independent
basis for asserting FTC jurisdiction over nonprofit hospitals.
Third, the Rockford court's interpretation of Clayton Act section 11
is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's Philadelphia decision. In
Philadelphia, the Court rejected the government's argument that sec-
tion 11 of the Clayton Act gave the FTC independent jurisdiction over
banks.106 The Court reasoned that section 11 did not disturb the
FTC's traditional lack of jurisdiction over banks."0 7 The Court also
implicitly rejected any notion of independent jurisdiction under sec-
tion 11.108
The Philadelphia rationale holds equally well for nonprofit hospital
mergers, that were traditionally not subject to FTC scrutiny. Section
7 of the Clayton Act originally applied only to stock transactions."
This excluded mergers between nonprofit entities because they did not,
and could not, issue stock.110 At the same time, the FTC Act
expressly limited FTC jurisdiction over nonprofit entities.11 Thus,
the Philadelphia rationale rejects the view that section 11 of the Clay-
ton Act upsets the traditional lack of FTC jurisdiction over nonprofit
hospital mergers.
(b) Congressional Debate Surrounding the Enactment of Section 7
Favors Exemption of Nonprofit Hospitals
Congressional debate concerning the 1950 amendments to the Clay-
ton Act suggests that Congress did not intend to cover nonprofit enti-
ties. 2 These debates show that Congress' purpose in amending
Clayton Act section 7 was to stem the "rising tide of economic concen-
tration" caused by "unchecked corporate expafision." 1 3 Congress
intended to close the loophole in the original section 7 that permitted
106. See Philadelphia, 374 U.S. at 336 n.l1.
107. IM ("We reject the argument that § II of the Clayton Act, as amended ... confers
jurisdiction over banks upon the FTC.").
108. IM ("[Tihere is no intimation in the legislative history ... that the FTC's traditional
lack of jurisdiction over banks was to be disturbed.").
109. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 57.
111. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
113. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).
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corporations to merge through asset acquisitions where they could not
merge by stock acquisitions.114
Nonprofit entities were not the subjects engaging in "unchecked
corporate expansion" that congressional debates addressed. Nor were
nonprofit mergers the target of earlier section 7 proscriptions, because
nonprofit hospitals could not merge by acquiring stock. Thus, it fol-
lows that Congress did not intend to address nonprofit mergers in
amending section 7.115
(c) Legislative History of the Celler-Kefauver Amendments
The legislative history of the 1950 amendments to the Clayton Act
indicates that Congress did not intend to affect nonprofit mergers.
The legislative history centers around a single theme: congressional
alarm at increased economic concentration resulting in aggregation of
wealth and power by large corporations." 6 Numerous reports by the
FTC, congressional committees, and executive agencies, attest to this
concern with the increased concentration of national, industrial corpo-
rations.'17 The 1950 amendments were a remedial step to close a gap,
not an attempt to expand Clayton jurisdiction to previously uncovered
entities."' Thus, the amendments enlarged the types of mergers cov-
ered under section 7, without extending the scope of entities covered
to include mergers between nonprofit organizations.
(d) The Rule that Antitrust Immunity is Not Lightly Implied
Although antitrust immunity is not lightly implied,' 19 exempting
nonprofit hospitals from section 7 of the Clayton Act is proper for two
reasons. First, exemption from Clayton Act section 7 would not, and
should not, exempt nonprofit hospitals from all antitrust laws.'2 °
Rather, a narrow exemption from section 7 would amount to partial
immunity, at most.
114. Id. at 316 n.29.
115. Congress apparently never discussed nonprofit entities during debates surrounding the
Clayton Act amendments. See Kopit & McCann, supra note 19, at 651.
116. See E. KINTNER, supra note 53, at 3611-16.
117. See Id. at 3385-86; Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 315 n.27; see also, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT (1948), reprinted in 4 E.
KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED
STATUTES 3236 (1980).
118. See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1950) (describing remedial purpose of
amendments).
119. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963).
120. Sherman Act proscriptions would continue to apply to nonprofit entities. See supra
notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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Second, Congress strongly implied that immunity for nonprofit hos-
pitals was proper, both by the express jurisdictional limitations con-
tained in the FTC Act, and by its refusal to modify those limitations.
Congress has repeatedly considered amendments to broaden FTC
jurisdiction, but has not given the FrC jurisdiction over nonprofit
entities. 21 Moreover, Congress has expressly- refused to grant the
FrC jurisdiction over nonprofit entities when specifically requested to
do so. 122
3. Congressional Intent to Exempt Nonprofit Entities from Section 7
of the Clayton Act
Both the language and legislative history of the Clayton amend-
ments indicate that Congress did not intend section 7 to apply to
mergers between nonprofit entities. Congress was certainly aware of
the existence and role of nonprofit entities when it amended section 7
of the Clayton Act. 123 Thus, the express limitations placed on FTC
jurisdiction over nonprofit entities exempts such entities from scrutiny
under Clayton Act section 7.
B. Policy Considerations Favor Exclusion of Nonprofit Hospital
Mergers From Clayton Section 7
Public policy favors exempting nonprofit hospital mergers from the
rigorous scrutiny of Clayton Act section 7 for at least two reasons.
First, such an exemption is consistent with repeated congressional
mandates to reduce hospital capacity and eliminate duplication of
services."' Second, nonprofit hospital mergers often benefit consum-
ers by maintaining access to hospital care and improving the quality of
services provided.' 25
121. See, eg., 135 CONG. REC. S7338, (daily ed. June 22, 1989) (statement by Senator Bryan).
122. See, ,ag., Federal Trade Comm'n Amendments of 1977 and OversighL" Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, House of Representatives Serial No. 95-36, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 81-82 (1977)
(statement of Calvin . Collier, Chairman, FTC, in support of H.RL 3816, which would have
extended FrC jurisdiction to include nonprofit corporations); see also Kopit & McCann, supra
note 19, at 650 n.47.
123. Congress was particularly familiar with the role of nonprofit hospitals. Just four years
before amending the Clayton Act, Congress passed a landmark bill to subsidize the construction
of nonprofit hospitals. Hospital Survey and Construction ("Hill-Burton") Act of 1946, Pub. L.
No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 291 (West 1973 & Supp. 1991)).
Nonprofit organizations exist because Congress grants them special treatment due to their
perceived benefits to society. See Gray & McNerney, supra note 30, at 1523. This special
treatment involves numerous laws. See Note, supra note 83 at 563.
124. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
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1. Exemption is Consistent With Congressional Mandates to Reduce
Hospital Capacity and Eliminate Duplication of Services
Exempting nonprofit hospitals from section 7 is consistent with cur-
rent federal health policy mandates. Both Congress and the Executive
Branch have repeatedly mandated reduction of excess hospital capac-
ity and elimination of duplicative services as a means of controlling
aggregate health care costs. 126
Excess hospital capacity is particularly costly as overall demand for
inpatient hospital services declines. 127 Unused capacity adds to the
overhead costs that hospitals must allocate among fewer patients, thus
adding significantly to the cost of an individual patient's hospital
services. 128
Unnecessary duplication of services, moreover, results from hospi-
tals attempting to obtain physician loyalty by purchasing expensive
medical technology, regardless of community need.'2 9 Studies show
that this unnecessary duplication adds significantly to hospital costs,
resulting in increased costs to consumers.' 30
Exempting nonprofit hospitals from section 7 of the Clayton Act
can help constrain hospital costs by fostering beneficial mergers that
eliminate both excess capacity and the motivation behind unnecessary
126. See National Health Planning and Resources Development Act (NHPRDA), 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 300k-300n-6 (West 1973 & Supp. 1991). A major goal of NHPRDA was to prevent
unnecessary duplication of services. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3001-2(a)(4). NHPRDA was amended in
1979 to foster competition in health care. However, the amendments singled out inpatient health
services for continued planning and coordination. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300k-2. Although NHPRDA
was repealed by Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 701(a), 100 Stat. 3799, Congress
reaffirmed the principles behind NHPRDA. See Kopit & McCann, supra note 19, at 642 n.18.
Many states retain some or all of the controls mandated by NHPRDA. See B. FURROW, S.
JOHNSON, T. JOST & R. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW: CASES, PROBLEMS & MATERIALS 396, 406.
(1987) [hereinafter HEALTH LAW] (discussing health planning); T. LITMAN & L. ROBINS,
HEALTH POLITICS AND POLICY 354-55 (1984); see also National Gerimedical Hospital and
Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 452 U.S. 378, 393 (1981) (holding that
NHPRDA did not completely preempt antitrust, but that some mandated activities might have
antitrust immunity).
127. See supra note 26.
128. See J. SUVER & B. NEUMANN, MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING FOR HEALTH CARE
ORGANIZATIONS 111 (1981).
129. See Ettinger, Justice Lacks a Credible Case Against Some Hospital Mergers, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Mar. 19, 1990, at 36; Higgins, Myths of Competitive Reform, HEALTH CARE
MGMT. REV., Winter 1991, at 67 (discussing unnecessary equipment purchases by hospitals, and
closure of necessary services).
130. See McManis, Competition's Failure Means It's Time for Collaboration, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, June 11, 1990, at 57. Studies indicate that hospital costs are highest in markets
where there is greater competition for technology, physicians, and patients. Id.
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duplication.13 1 Promoting such beneficial mergers is thus consistent
with policy mandates to reduce excess hospital capacity and eliminate
unnecessary duplication of services.1 32
2. Exempting Nonprofit Hospital Mergers Also Benefits Consumers
Exempting nonprofit hospital mergersfrom section7 of the Clayton
Act benefits consumers indirectly by restraining hospital costs.
1 33
Exemption may also benefit consumers directly, by maintaining access
to hospital services in facilities that would otherwise close,13 ' and by
improving the quality of services available.
135
(a) Nonprofit Mergers May Help Maintain Access
Exempting nonprofit hospital mergers from Clayton Act section 7
may help maintain patient access to vital services. Studies indicate
that hospitals most often close in areas where residents' health care
needs are already underserved. 136 Such closures further reduce access
to hospital services in these areas. 137 Nonprofit hospital mergers, how-
ever, can help maintain access by keeping marginal hospitals viable,
thereby enabling them to continue meeting community needs.' 38 Con-
sequently, permitting such mergers helps maintain vital community
access to health care.
(b) Nonprofit Mergers Can Result in Better Quality of Care
Nonprofit hospital mergers may also benefit consumers by increas-
ing the quality of care hospitals provide. Studies show that hospitals
performing larger volumes of services produce better patient out-
131. See Greene, supra note 8, at 28. In Rockford, the City of Rockford filed an amicus brief
arguing that the proposed merger would benefit consumers by decreasing hospital costs. Burda,
Rockford Merger Rejection Not Best for Patients - Briefs, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Sept 10,
1990, at 100.
132. See HALH LAW, supra note 126, at 402-06.
133. These consumer benefits are indirect because most consumers have health insurance that
pays for hospital costs. See BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD, ENvRomONTAL ANALYSIS 1990,
supra note 27, at 8.
134. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
136. See Higgins, supra note 129, at 66; J. HOLLINGSWORTH &'E. HOLLINGSWORTH,
CONTROVERSY ABoUT AMERIcAN HOSPITALS: FUNDING, OWNERSHIP AND PERFORMANCE,
125-50 (1987).
137. See Higgins, supra note 129, at 66. Even when marginal hospitals survive, they
frequently must cut those unprofitable services that are most needed in the community. For
example, between 1984 and 1988, 25 percent of hospital trauma units were closed. Id at 67.
138. See Burda, supra note 131, at 100; see also Tokarski, Mergers Don't Cut Access,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Nov. 26, 1990, at 2 (citing study indicating that mergers maintain
access and increase services provided).
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comes, 139 as evidenced by lower morbidity and mortality figures.1l"
Exempting nonprofit hospitals from Clayton Act section 7 permits
them to consolidate services and increase the volume of services per-
formed.14 ' As a result, exemption can improve the quality of care that
hospitals provide.
3. Judicial Reluctance to Recognize Policy Factors in Evaluating
Antitrust Liability
Despite the impact that antitrust law has on the cost, quality and
accessibility of health care, most courts are reluctant to recognize pub-
lic policy factors as defenses to alleged antitrust violations. 42 In
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,143 for
example, the Court rejected the argument that enhanced public safety
justified restrictions on competitive bidding among engineers.144
The rationale in Engineers, however, is distinguishable on two
grounds. First, Engineers involved a horizontal restraint similar to
price-fixing, that has long been considered a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. Permitting public policy justifications in merger cases
under rule of reason analysis, on the other hand, merely allows courts
to weigh all factors in balancing putative benefits and costs.
Second, in Engineers there was no causal link between price-fixing
and the quality of engineering services. 145 The Court rejected the ten-
uous link between price competition and competent work by profes-
sionals.1 46 In cases of marginal hospitals, on the other hand, the
causal link is much clearer: the issue is not whether quality of care will
suffer, but whether the hospital will remain viable and able to provide
any care at all.
139. See, eg., Flood, Scott & Ewy, Does Practice Make Perfect?: The Relation Between
Hospital Volume and Outcomes for Selected Diagnostic Categories, 22 MEDICAL CARE, Feb.
1984, at 98; Maerki, Luft & Hunt, Selecting Categories of Patients for Regionalization:
Implications of the Relationship Between Volume and Outcome, 24 MEDICAL CARE, Feb. 1986, at
148; Showstack, Rosenfeld, Garnick, Luft, Schaffarzick & Fowles, Association of Volume With
Outcome of Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery: Scheduled vs. Nonscheduled Operations, 257 J.
A.M.A. 785 (1987).
140. Morbidity and mortality are statistical measures of sickness and death, respectively.
MOSBY'S MEDICAL, NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH DICTIONARY 770-71 (3d ed. 1990).
141. Hospitals can consolidate services by eliminating duplication of low volume services.
142. See, e.g., supra note 63.
143. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
144. Id. at 693-94.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 686.
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C. A Proposal for Continued Sherman Act Scrutiny of Nonprofit
Hospital Mergers
Although congressional intent, statutory construction, and public
policy favor exempting nonprofit hospitals from section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act, some commentators argue that without close scrutiny, non-
profit hospital mergers will permit collusion among hospitals, thus
destroying competition in the hospital industry. 47 In the event such
mergers do threaten consumers, however, two safeguards exist. First,
section 1 of the Sherman Act continues to protect the public against
demonstrably harmful hospital mergers. Second, Congress can readily
amend either the Clayton or FTC Acts to permit FTC jurisdiction
over nonprofit hospital mergers under Clayton Act section 7.
Clayton Act section 7 properly applies to mergers where the dan-
gers of incipient harm are great, and the potential benefits of permit-
ting mergers are few. Nonprofit hospital mergers represent the
opposite paradigm; the dangers are few, while the potential benefits
are great. Instead of extending the Clayton Act to cover nonprofit
hospital mergers, courts should continue to use the Sherman Act stan-
dard to scrutinize these mergers. 148
The Sherman Act section I standard is appropriate for two reasons.
First, it adequately protects consumers from demonstrably harmful
mergers by permitting the government to challenge nonprofit hospital
mergers that are motivated by anticompetitive purpose, or actually
result in harm to consumers. Second, the standard under section 1 of
the Sherman Act benefits consumers and society, by permitting merg-
ers where the evidence does not support a clear finding of harmful
effect. Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, some beneficial mergers
would likely occur that would be foreclosed by Clayton Act section 7
scrutiny. These mergers can help hospitals reduce unnecessary costs,
maintain access to services, and improve the quality of care provided.
Such benefits should not be traded away for the ethereal promise of
competitive gains, by preserving a multitude of weak hospitals rather
than fewer, more viable ones.
III. CONCLUSION
Nonprofit hospitals are undergoing rapid consolidation in response
to dramatic changes in the delivery of, and reimbursement for, health
care services. Recently, the federal government has attempted to fore-
147. See, e-g., Baker, supra note 25, at 115.
148. See supra note 42 and accompanying text for discussion of the Sherman Act standard.
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stall this consolidation by applying the Clayton Act to mergers
between nonprofit hospitals. Applying section 7 of the Clayton Act to
nonprofit hospital mergers neither accords with sound legal interpreta-
tion, nor with important public policy objectives. Instead, Clayton
Act scrutiny may prevent beneficial mergers by which nonprofit hospi-
tals can reduce costs, maintain access to services, and improve the
quality of care provided. Courts should continue to scrutinize non-
profit hospital mergers under the proscriptions of the Sherman Act,
and should avoid extending the Clayton Act to mergers not within its
intended scope.
David L. Glazer
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